Negotiable Instruments—A Comparison of Washington Law and Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 [Part 2] by Cosway, Richard
Washington Law Review 
Volume 38 Number 4 
12-1-1963 
Negotiable Instruments—A Comparison of Washington Law and 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 [Part 2] 
Richard Cosway 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Cosway, Negotiable Instruments—A Comparison of Washington Law and Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 3 [Part 2], 38 Wash. L. Rev. 719 (1963). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol38/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-A COMPARISON OF
WASHINGTON LAW AND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLE 3t
RICHARD COSWAY*
Section 3-113. Seal. An instrument otherwise negotiable is within
this Article even though it is under a seal.
Though the use of private seals has been statutorily abolished in
Washington,... there is some decisional authority recogmzmg that a
seal imports, in a rebuttable way, consideration 20 To the extent
that a negotiable instrument is involved, the various provisions of
the Code respecting consideration12' will supplant those cases; none
of which involved negotiable instruments.
Section 3-114. Date, Antedating, Postdating.
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the fact
that it is undated, antedated or postdated.
(2) Where an instrument is antedated or postdated the time when
it is payable is determined by the stated date if the instrument
is payable on demand or at a fixed period after date.
(3) Where the mstrument or any signature thereon is dated, the
date is presumed to be correct.
With respect to subsections (1) and (2), no authority other than
the controlling statutes122 has been found.
It is to be noted that any signature on an instrument may be dated,
and this obviously includes an indorsement. In view of the provisions
of section 3-503, computing the time for presentment from the time
each secondary party becomes liable on the instrument, it is -highly
desirable that indorsements be dated. In Dittmar v. Frye,,2' it was
argued that a dated indorsement, clearly showing that it had been
made after the execution of the instrument, coupled with e'idence
* Professor of Law, Umversity of Washington.
t The first m this series of articles appeared in 38 WAsH. L. REv. 501 (1963).
119 RCW 64.04.090.
120 Gates v. Herr, 102 Wash. 131, 172 Pac. 912 (1918), RESTATEmExT, CONTRACTS,
Wash. Annots. §110 (1935).
121 UCC § 3-408 is of principal concern.
122 RCW 62.01.006 and 62.01.012 [NIL §§ 6, 12].
323 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939).
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that the indorser received no consideration, sufficiently refuted any
presumption of consideration for his undertaking. The holding, of
course, was to the contrary, because the instrument may have been
originally executed with the understanding and requirement that
another subsequently indorse. Where such an agreement exists, there
is consideration for the subsequent indorsement.
There has been a presumption in Washington that dates shown on
negotiable instruments are correct.'24 Indeed, the suggestion is con-
tained in the governing case that this presumption must be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence. Subsection (3), when read in con-
nection with section 1-201(31), alters this requirement, for only
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the date is incorrect need
be introduced.
Section 3-115. Incomplete Instruments.
(1) When a paper whose contents at the time of signing show that
it is intended to become an instrument is signed while still in-
complete in any necessary respect it cannot be enforced until
completed, but when it is completed in accordance with
authority given it is effective as completed.
(2) If the completion is unauthorized the rules as to material alter-
ation apply (Section 3-407), even though the paper was not
delivered by the maker or drawer; but the burden of establish-
ing that any completion is unauthorized is on the party so
asserting.
This particular section has been identified by most commentators
as containing one of the major changes in the law of negotiable instru-
ments, because it reverses the rule announced in the N.I.L.'s provision
with respect to non-delivery of incomplete paper. 5 The Washington
decisions on this particular point have not followed the majority rule,
nor have they adopted the rule here codified. Prior to the Code, it
seems definitely established that if paper in incomplete form is stolen
and filled in without authority, no holder can recover thereon, because
this is a "real" defense. But on two occasions, the Washington court
has mitigated the hardship of such a rule by estopping the person
who signed the incomplete paper and who carelessly handled it from
124 National City Bank v. Shelton Elec. Co., 96 Wash. 74, Pac. 933 (1917).
125 RCW 62.01.015 [NIL § 15].
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asserting the defense.'26 The specific peculiarity of the Washington
decisions is that they have relied on such estoppel in order to protect
holders of the instruments. Most courts would find such estoppel in
a suit involving the drawer and drawee of a check, where the drawee
bank had paid out on a check signed but not completed or delivered
by the drawer. 2 But the Washington court goes farther than most
in imposing such an estoppel in favor of a mere holder. The difference
is that the drawee-drawer relationship may impose a duty on the
drawer to protect the drawee from harm, since the drawee is obli-
gated to pay properly drawn paper. On the other hand, no one is
bound to purchase negotiable paper, so there may be no duty as to
such purchasers to foresee and protect against intervening completions
or alterations. This matter is presented again in section 3-406.
Where the instrument is filled in by an agent who has limited
authority and who exceeds it, a holder in due course may recover
under the Code and a decision in Washington 28 in accordance with
the terms as written in the instrument. This makes the requirements
of due course holding an important consideration here. In substance,
the rule of the Code is: (a) one who takes the instrument in incom-
plete form cannot be a due course holder,'29 but one may take paper
after it has been completed, even knowing that it had left the issuer's
hands in incomplete form, and nonetheless be a due course holder.' 0
The Code assumes, as did the N.I.L. section 14, that the person
executing the instrument harbored an intention as to the proper
method of filling in blanks therein. In one interesting Washington
decision, this intention did not exist, because the drawer of a pur-
ported check carefully omitted to designate a drawee bank.L8 He was
not guilty of forgery because such an instrument would have no
efficacy even if genuine. The Code will not change this rule.
Section 3-116. Instruments Payable To Two Or More Persons.
An instrument payable to the order of two or more persons
(a) if in the alternative is payable to any one of them and may
'
26 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Spokane Valley Growers' Union, 132 Wash. 607, 232
Pac. 691 (1925), noted, 9 MIrx. L. REv. 569 (1925), 32 Case & Com. 111 (1926);
Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash. 8, 216 Pac. 862 (1923). .
327 Britton, Defenses, Claims of Owmership and Equities-A Comparison of the
Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with Corresponding Provisions of
Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1955).
128 Baumeister, Vollmer & Scott Bank v. Talbott, 129 Wash. 509, 225 Pac. 238
(1924).
129 Section 3-304(1) (a).
130 Section 3-304(4) (d).
231 State v. Taes, 5 Wn2d 51, 104 P2d 751 (1940).
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be negotiated, discharged or enforced by any of them who
has possession of it;
(b) if not in the alternative is payable to all of them and may
be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them.
This section for the first time spells out the mechanism for and
effect of creating jointly held and severally held paper. The present
statute contains an inexplicable gap, because it clearly recognizes the
difference between paper payable to persons jointly (to A and B),
and to them in the alternative (to A or B),"' yet the prescribed
mechanism for indorsement of multiple payee paper is adapted only
to jointly held paper. 33 The Code clearly and concisely overcomes
the inadequacies of the N.I.L."'
One Washington decision, though not involving specifically the
problem here covered, presents an interesting point.'35 The case in-
volved an instrument payable to "A and B," and A indorsed the
instrument over to B, the co-payee. The ultimate issue was whether
B could be a due course holder, and the holding was in the affirmative.
The validity of this holding has, though, been questioned.'36 It raises
once again the problem of whether a payee may be a due course
holder, to be answered under the N.I.L. by whether the payee takes
through negotiation. Assuming for the moment that negotiation of
order paper requires indorsement of the entire paper, is it not arguable
that the co-payee did not acquire title to the entire paper through
the indorsement? This matter will again be referred to under section
3-302, suffice it here to point out that under the Code obviously one
of two payees may indorse to the other who will, if he meets the re-
quirements, become a holder in due course.
Section 3-117. Instruments Payable With Words Of Description.
An instrument made payable to a named person with the addition
of words describing him
(a) as agent or officer of a specified person is payable to his
principal but the agent or officer may act as if he were the
holder;
(b) as any other fiduciary for a specified person or purpose is
'32 RCW 62.01.008 [NIL § 8].
1'3 RCW 62.01.041 [NIL § 41].
'1' See BAILEY, BANK CHECKS, § 5.14 (1962).
1S5 State Bank v. Pacific Grain Co., 125 Wash. 149, 215 Pac. 350 (1923).
136 BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 633 (7th ed. 1948).
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payable to the payee and may be negotiated, discharged or
enforced by him;
(c) in any other manner is payable to the payee unconditionally
and the additional words are without effect on subsequent
parties.
The addition of words of description to names appearing on nego-
tiable instruments generally raises one of two types of problems. The
first, and most frequent, concerns the liability created by a signature
followed by such words, such as "John Jones, Treasurer of X Co.," or
"John Jones, Treasurer," or "John Jones, Trustee for X." This type
of problem is governed by a subsequent section of the Code.'37 The
second type of problem, and the one here covered, concerns the inter-
ests created in paper payable to persons whose names are modified
by words of description, such as "Pay to the order of John Jones,
Treasurer of X Co." The section clearly emphasizes that such a
designation, clearly showing the principal, sufficiently shows the
obligor's intention that the designated principal is, in fact, the owner
of the claim. By the same token, an instrument payable to John Doe,
Trustee for Richard Roe is beneficially owned by Richard Roe.
There has been only one decision in Washington on the point, and
it accords with the view taken by the Code.'18 In that case an instru-
ment was payable to "Winifred Lundberg, Guardian of Helen Lund-
berg," and in a suit brought by a substitute guardian of Helen, the
obligors contended that their liability was to Winifred personally.
Parol evidence was admitted to show this to be untrue and thus to
enable the plaintiffs to recover. Under the Code, it is clearly under-
stood that Winifred is designated only for convenience and that the
beneficial owner is Helen.
There are many ways in which one dealing with an agent may issue
an obligation, intending subjectively to have the principal become the
owner thereof. It may be done:
Pay to the order of Principal
Pay to the order of John Doe, Agent for Principal
Pay to the order of John Doe, Agent
Only in the third situation is there no disclosure of the interest of the
designated principal, and in this situation the word "agent" may be
disregarded by one dealing with the agent Doe, unless he knows other
137 Section 3-403.138 Hansen v. Lindell, 14 Wn.2d 643, 129 P.2d 234 (1942).
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facts to show that Doe is actually holding the instrument for a known
principal.
There are some Washington decisions to the effect that a principal,
though not named on an instrument, may recover thereon, 3 ' even
though the paper appears to be payable in the name of the agent who
has not indorsed. These decisions seem justified so long as the evidence
clearly shows that the principal was the intended payee, even though
not named. So long as this is the true situation, no harm can result by
allowing recovery by the actual owner.
The major emphasis of this section of the Code seems, however,
directed to the correlative situation in which the rights of one who
has dealt with the designated agent or fiduciary are involved. Such
a person will be protected under this section, for the agent may act
as if he were the holder, and the fiduciary may, being the owner, deal
with the paper so as to cut off the beneficiary's rights, unless the person
dealing with the agent or fiduciary knows of a breach of duty.' Thus
the agent or fiduciary may cash checks designating him as agent or
fiduciary and disclosing the principal or beneficiary. This is consistent
with the Washington decisions respecting the position of depositary
banks which receive fiduciary held funds.' Unless there is knowledge
of a breach of trust or other duty, the bank is not affected by the
fiduciary limitations.
At this point, the Hansen v. Lindell. 2 decision ought to be briefly
reconsidered. The instrument, payable to "Winifred Lundberg, Guard-
ian of Helen Lundberg," was held by Winifred until the statute of
limitations barred an action by her. The suit, it will be recalled, was
brought by another guardian acting for Helen, who was a minor.
Under the presently discussed section of the Code, the designated
guardian, Winifred, could have enforced, negotiated, or discharged the
instrument. Did she discharge it by allowing the statute of limitations
to run? It would seem that she did not, and that the actual holding in
the case would survive enactment of the Code: the minor's claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations. The bar resulting from the
operation of the statute of limitations is not a discharge of the indebted-
ness.'
43
'39 First Nat'l Life Assur. Soc'y of America v. Farquhar, 75 Wash. 667, 135 Pac.
619 (1913) ; Stinson v. Sachs, 8 Wash. 391, 36 Pac. 287 (1894).
140 The problem of "notice" is covered by § 3-304.
141 E.g., Moody v. Clarke County Bank of Washougal, 181 Wash.. 263, 42 P.2d 803
(1935) ; Mott Iron Works v. Metropolitan Bank, 78 Wash. 294, 139 Pac. 36 (1914).
142 See note 138 supra.
143 See 1 CoRB N, CONTRACTS, § 214 (1950).
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Section 3-118. Ambiguous Terms And Rules Of Construction.
The following rules apply to every instrument:
(a) Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or
a note the holder may treat it as either. A draft drawn on
the drawer is effective as a note.
(b) Handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms,
and typewritten control printed.
(c) Words control figures except that if the words are ambig-
uous figures control.
(d) Unless otherwise specified a provision for interest means
interest at the judgment rate at the place of payment from
the date of the instrument, or if it is undated from the date
of issue.
(e) Unless the instrument otherwise specifies two or more per-
sons who sign as maker, acceptor or drawer or indorser and
as a part of the same transaction are jointly and severally
liable even though the instrument contains such words as
"I promise to pay."
(f) Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a
single extension for not longer than the original period. A
consent to extension, expressed in the instrument, is binding
on secondary parties and accommodation makers. A holder
may not exercise his option to extend an instrument over the
objection of a maker or acceptor or other party who in
accordance with Section 3-604 tenders full payment when
the instrument is due.
This section is mainly a restatement of principles applicable under
the N.I.L. '" Consistent with clause (a) is a Washington decision on
the point. 45 The decision holds that a bill drawn on an insurance
company by its general adjuster is in effect a bill drawn on the drawer,
and thus the holder may treat it as a note. The substantive effect of
this rule is that the holder may recover from the drawee or drawer
without meeting the requirements of presentment imposed before a
drawer may normally be held.
144 RCW 62.01.017 [NIL § 17].
'145 Creditors Claim & Adjustment Co. v. First Seattle Dexter Horton Nat'l Bank,
171 Wash. 575, 18 P.2d 844 (1933).
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Clause (b) produces the same result as, and can be illustrated by,
Lombardo v. Lombardini."4 ' The note in suit was executed on October
24, 1902 and made payable "one year from date," but the scrivener
used a printed form bearing the printed date "189-", and he filled in
a "2," making the instrument appear to have been executed on October
24, 1892. Another portion of the instrument stated, in writing, that
the instrument was due on Oct. 24, 1903. The plaintiff, payee, changed
the date the scrivener had placed on the instrument from 1892 to 1902,
and the obligor contended that he was thus discharged by material
alteration. The Court held that there was no material alteration since
the written words governed over the printed form, and thus the instru-
ment can be shown to have been executed in 1902.
Clause (c) is a slight change from the N.I.L. provisions, because
figures shown in an instrument will control where the writing is ambi-
guous. Otherwise, as was true under the N.I.L., the written terms
control. Clause (d) is likewise a reworking of the provisions contained
in the N.I.L. 47
Clause (e) restates the rule of Pease v. Syler.4 8
Clause (f) has no counterpart in Washington statutes or decisions.
Section 3-119. Other Writings Affecting Instrument.
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or
affected by any other written agreement executed as a part
of the same transaction, except that a holder in due course is
not affected by any limitation of his rights arising out of the
separate written agreement if he had no notice of the limita-
tion when he took the instrument.
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an
instrument.
A discussion of the parol evidence rule is not highly apposite to this
section of the Code, and further its applicability to all contracts,
negotiable and otherwise, ill adapts it to discussion in an article about
14657 Wash. 352, 106 Pac. 907 (1910).
147 See note 141 supra. The reference to interest at the judgment rate is new, and
RCW 4.56.110 seems to control. Difficulties might be anticipated if the interest rate
there stated differed from that stated in RCW 9.52.010.
48 78 Wash. 24, 138 Pac. 310 (1914). In Churchill v. Miller, 90 Wash. 694, 156
Pac. 851 (1916), a note stating, "I or we promise to pay," and signed by husband
and wife was held to be a "joint and several" note of the husband and wife. This,
too, is consistent with the Code.
[VOL. 38
1963] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND THE UCC 727
negotiable instruments. Yet" a reference to that rule i" an Official
Commefit suggests the need for a brief examination at this point. The
Code disclaims any coverage of the parol evidence rule, except insofar
as it is implicit in section 3-118.1' It is, of course, well settled that
the parol evidence rule does apply to negotiable instruments.150 This
is not as obvious a point as first appears, because the obligations of
drawers and indorsers are rarely spelled out in writing; instead, they
are imposed or implied by law. These undertakings are so well under-
stood and so widely accepted, however, as to make them contractual
obligations within the parol evidence rule.15' For the moment, this
statement must be only provisionally accepted as true, because it will
be re-examined shortly.
Three fairly frequent situations have posed parol evidence rule prob-
lems in connection with bills and notes in Washington. The first
involves the signer who fully believes he will never have to pay and
the payee who shares this view, both believing that a third person will
perform his primary obligation of paying. So strong is the belief,
indeed, that the signer and the payee will orally agree that the signer
will not be held to his undertaking. This oral agreement affronts the
parol evidence rule, at least where it is made with a maker of a note
or drawer of a draft."2 There seems to be no rational distinction
149 Section 3-119, Official Comment 1; § 3-118, Official Comment 1.
15 0 BRrrToN, BiLLs & NoTEs, 121 (2d ed. 1961); McGregor v. First Farmers-
Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 180 Wash. 440, 40 P2d 144 (1935).
162 Bryan v. Duff, 12 Wash. 233, 40 Pac. 936 (1895), illustrates the point.
152 Legal Adjustment Bureau v. West Coast Constr. Co., 162 Wash. 260, 298 Pac.
429 (1931) ; Whitman Realty & Inv. Co. v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171 (1931);
Puget Sound Tel. Co. v. Telechronometer Co., 130 Wash. 468, 227 Pac. 867 (1924)(however note may be avoided for fraud); Larsen v. Betcher, 114 Wash. 247, 195
Pac. 27 (1921); Moore v. Kildall, 111 Wash. 504, 191 Pac. 394 (1920); Bank of
Calif. v. Starrett, 110 Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410 (1920), noted, 90 CENT. L.J. 394(1920) ; Naylor v. Lovell, 109 Wash. 409, 186 Pac. 855 (1920) (makes an exception
where mistake is shown); Van Tassel v. McGrail, 93 Wash. 380, 160 Pac. 1053(1916); Post v. Tamm, 91 Wash. 504, 158 Pac. 91 (1916); Taylor v. Parish, 86
Wash. 141, 149 Pac. 635 (1915) (makes an exception where the writing is ambigu-
ous); Gwinn v. Ford, 85 Wash. 571, 148 Pac. 891 (1915), aff'd 91 Wash. 498, 158
Pac. 536 (1916); First Nat. Life Assur. Soc'y of America v. Farquhar, 75 Wash.
667, 135 Pac. 619 (1913) ; Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910), noted,
23 YAL. L.J. 313 (1914); Carr v. Jones, 29 Wash. 78, 69 Pac. 646 (1902) (makes
an exception where the writing is ambiguous); Bryan v. Duff, supra note 151;
Tacoma Mill Co. v. Sherwood, 11 Wash. 492, 39 Pac. 977 (1895).
A fortiori the evidence is inadmissible against a holder in due course. Yakima
Fin. Corp. v. Mullins, 138 Wash. 553, 245 Pac. 5 (1926); Anderson v. Mitchell, 51
Wash. 265, 98 Pac. 751 (1908).
The parol evidence rule does not, of course, invalidate oral agreements subsequent
in time to the writing, even if reached on the same day on which the writing was
signed. Commercial Bank v. Hart, 10 Wash. 303, 38 Pac. 1114 (1894).
Though, as some of the cases previously cited in this note have held, the accepted
rule is that an obligor in a money undertaking may not show that an oral agreement
had been reached to discharge the instrument by something other than a money pay-
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between such liability and the liability of an indorser, but the Wash-
ington Court has on occasion enforced a parol agreement absolving an
indorser from liability.153
The second situation in which the parol evidence rule has created
problems results from an express provision of the N.I.L' 54 A similar
provision, incidentally, is included in the Code. 55 The effect of these
provisions is to recognize the accepted rule that conditions precedent
to contractual obligations may be shown, as between immediate parties,
even though the conditions rest in parol. Though the cases will be
adverted to in the discussion of section 3-306, it must be noted at
this point that the parol evidence rule will preclude the setting up
of conditions subsequent, and it may preclude the showing of an
internal condition precedent.'56
The third and final typical situation in which the parol evidence
rule has been applicable to bills and notes is the case of the signer
who appears on an instrument as principal debtor, but who seeks to
show that he really signed as agent 57 or, more frequently, as surety. 5
Except for the cases where the rights of the purported surety and
alleged principal inter se are concerned, in which cases parol evidence
is clearly admissible to show the true relationship of the parties, 5
the problem is a very difficult one, insofar as the Washington decisions
are concerned.' The Code covers the problem in section 3-415, and
discussion of the cases will be postponed until that point.
ment, this rule has not been uniformly enforced. Blaine v. Darwin, 160 Wash. 327, 295
Pac. 131 (1931) ; Stevens v. Selvidge, 103 Wash. 683, 175 Pac. 294 (1918) ; Fidelity
Nat'l Bank v. E. H. Stanton Co., 93 Wash. 344, 160 Pac. 960 (1916); Washington
Trust Co. v. Keyes, 79 Wash. 61, 139 Pac. 638, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 279 (1914) (This
case, however, involved a written agreement contemporaneous to a note, but the
separate agreement was itself ambiguous. Parol was admitted.)
153 White v. Armstrong, 166 Wash. 346, 7 P.2d 12 (1932) ; Reardan v. Cockrell,
54 Wash. 400, 103 Pac. 457 (1909). To the contrary, holding that parol evidence is
inadmissible to modify the implied undertaking resulting from an absolute indorsement
and delivery of negotiable paper is Allen v. Chambers, 13 Wash. 327, 43 Pac. 57
(1895). To be distinguished, and seemingly properly decided, is Keeler v. Commercial
Printing Co., 16 Wash. 526, 48 Pac. 239 (1897), holding that parol evidence may be
introduced to show that an apparently absolute transfer of a note by indorsement
was actually only for security. This holding seems consistent with the usual view
that absolute transfers may be shown to have been intended to be security transfers
only.
154 RCW 62.01.016 [NIL § 16].
155 Section 3-306.
156 See Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part 1, 34 WASH. L. REv.
345, 383 (1959) ; Dickson v. Protzman, 123 Wash. 247, 212 Pac. 249 (1923) ; Post v.
Tamm, 91 Wash. 504, 158 Pac. 91 (1916).
157 Shuey v. Adair, 18 Wash. 188, 51 Pac. 388 (1897).
158 E.g., Lamberton v. Shannon, 13 Wash. 404, 43 Pac. 336 (1896) ; Allen v. Cham-
bers, 13 Wash. 327, 43 Pac. 57 (1895) ; Tacoma Mill Co. v. Sherwood, 11 Wash. 492,
39 Pac. 977 (1895).
159 Handsaker v. Pederson, 71 Wash. 218, 128 Pac. 230 (1912).
160 Shattuck, stpra note 156, at 381-82.
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The Code section herein discussed does not, of course, refer to
these matters of oral agreements and their effect on contemporaneous
writings. Instead, it deals with the problem of contemporaneous
writings and, in substance, adopts two rules: First, as to persons
party to the transaction or knowing of the terms of the writing, the
separate writing and the note or draft are to be read together. Second,
they are not to be read together, however, to achieve the effect of non-
negotiability. Both of these rules have been accepted in Washington.
The impact of the second rule, stated in subsection (2), is to ob-
viate any possible holding that a note executed contemporaneously
with another document, usually a mortgage, is rendered not negotiable
because of provisions in the mortgage. For purposes of negotiability,
but not necessarily of construction, the two documents are separate.
Washington has recognized this for some time.'' Indeed, Washington
recognizes, as do most states, that once the note has been determined
to be negotiable, by its own terms, the negotiability "rubs off" on the
security document accompanying it, and the holder may foreclose his
mortgage free of defenses." 2
Concerning the interpretation of the two documents executed as
part of one transaction, the Washington Court has, as the Code pro-
vides, construed them together.' This is to be supplemented by the
oft-repeated Washington rule that conflicts between provisions in a
note and simultaneously signed writing are to be resolved in favor
of the terms in the note." 4 Of course, a holder in due course is not
bound by limitations contained in the separate document of which he
was not aware. 8 5
So willing is the Washington Court to construe together all docu-
ments executed as part of one transaction, that it has held that an
acceleration clause in a mortgage (and not in the note) may be used
161 Moore & Co. v. Burling, 93 Wash. 217, 160 Pac. 420 (1916) ; Barker v. Sartori,
66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac. 611 (1911).
12 American Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911),
aff'd, 67 Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26 (1912).
103 Mallette v. Pohlman Inv. Co., 179 Wash. 654, 38 P.2d 357 (1934) ; Wm. Brelle
& Co. v. Green Mountain Lumber Co., 149 Wash. 158, 270 Pac. 425 (1928); Ire-
land v. Scharpenberg, 54 Wash. 558, 103 Pac. 801 (1909) ; Gross v. Bennington, 52
Wash. 417, 100 Pac. 846 (1909).
184 Walker v. Cascade Milk Products Co., 21 Wn2d 615, 152 P2d 603 (1944);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Seattle Ass'n. of Credit Men, 190 Wash. 284,
67 P2d 882 (1937); Van Tassell v. McGrail, 93 Wash. 380, 160 Pac. 1053 (1916);
Lovell v. Musselman, 81 Wash. 477, 142 Pac. 1143 (1914); Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Johnson, 15 Wash. 536 (1897) ; Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Wolverton, 11 Wash. 108, 39
Pac. 248 (1895).
'05 Bowen v. Rury, 117 Wash. 30, 200 Pac. 789 (1921); American Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Helgesen, supra note 162.
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to accelerate the maturity of the note.' 6 The cases from other juris-
dictions are not harmonious on this, but the Code does not require
a change in the Washington rule." 7
Section 3-120. Instruments "Payable Through" Bank.
An instrument which states that it is "payable through" a bank
or the like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make
presentment but does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the
instrument.
The function of this section has been stated as follows:
For many years, we have handled payable through drafts drawn (in
most cases) on head offices of insurance companies, which drafts state
that they are payable through our bank. In this type of operation, the
insurance company is given an opportunity to inspect the drafts but
substantially all other phases of the transaction are performed by us.
In this type of case prior to the Code we were never certain as to what
our status was, particularly, whether we were a payor bank or a
collecting bank.
Under section 3-120 of the Code, this exact type of situation is dealt
with and all doubt as to our status is removed.168
In Bartholomew v. First Nat. Bank of Everett,6 a draft was drawn,
directed to a newspaper in Monte Cristo, Washington, "Via Everett
National Bank." The check was presented to that bank which refused
payment, and the action was instituted by the drawer to recover
damages from the presenter for wrongful and malicious protesting
and publishing of the protest. It was held, contrary to the position
taken by the Code on the point, that the draft was ambiguous, but
reasonably interpreted as designating the bank as the place where
presentment for payment was to be made. Under the Code, obviously,
the instrument is not treated as if drawn on the bank, for it is only
an agent to collect.
Section 3-121. Instruments Payable At Bank.
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is not
of itself an order or authorization to the bank to pay it.
166 Wilson v. Kirchan, 143 Wash. 342, 255 Pac. 368 (1927), noted, 23 ILL. L. REv.
183 (1928).
167 See Note, 17 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 804 (1963) ; Britton, Formal Requisites of Nego-
tiability-77e Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial
Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 5 (1953).
168 Letter to members of the delegation from the Ohio Bankers Association investi-
gating the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code in Massachusetts, from George
I. Emery, Cashier, The First National Bank of Boston, July 29, 1960.
1,9 18 Wash. 683, 52 Pac. 239 (1898).
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Three sections of the N..LL., quoted below, are pertinent to the
rights and obligations arising from domiciled paper:
Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the
person primarily liable on the instrument; but if the instrument is, by
its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it
there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a
tender of payment upon his part. (Emphasis added.)170
The Code's counterpart of this appears in section 3-604(3). It is
obvious that instruments designated as payable at a bank are payable
at a particular place within this rule. 1
Where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equivalent to
an order to pay the same for the account of the principal debtor
thereonY.7 2
The presently discussed Code section is the counterpart of this and
is, as adopted in some of the western states and 'as proposed in Wash-
ington in the language appearing above, contrary to the N.I.L. pro-
vision. A note payable under the N.I.L. provision is, in effect, a check
drawn on the bank designated as the place of payment .17  In effect,
therefore, the maker of such a note is secondarily liable under the
N.I.L .17 The bank is under a duty to pay such a note on presentment
for payment, if the maker has funds on deposit therein sufficient to
cover the item. 5 Under the Code, there is no such duty or even an
authorization to the bank to pay, absent special instructions to that
end.
A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon
to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. 78
The applicability of this section to a note payable at a bank is not
clear. The general rule seems to be that this section does not so
apply.' The Code, even though it is enacted as proposed in Wash-
170 RCW 62.01.070 [NIL § 70].
171 An instrument due "at Spokane, Washington," though, is not payable at a
special place within the meaning of this rule. Bardsley v. Washington Mill Co., 54
Wash. 553, 103 Pac. 822 (1909).
172 RCW 62.01.087 [NIL § 871.
173 Peninsula Nat'l Bank v. Pederson Constr. Co., 91 Wash. 621, 158 Pac. 246(1916).
174 3 PAToN'S DIGEST 3031 (1944).
175Id., at 3032. A statement in an early Washington case that it is the maker's
duty to remit to the bank designated for payment, and it is the holder's "duty" to
present the instrument there, is not entirely accurate. Dewing v. Crueger, 7 Wash.
590, 35 Pac. 393 (1894).
176 RCW 62.01.186 [NIL § 86].
1773 PAToN's DIGEST 3042 (1944).
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ington, will nonetheless discharge the maker of such a note if during
a period of delay in presentment to the bank designated that bank
should become insolvent." 8 This matter is controlled by section 3-502
and will be discussed in connection with that section.
The point to be observed from this discussion is that the presently
discussed section of the Code relates only to the authorization or
obligation on the part of a bank at which a note or draft is payable
to pay that instrument. There is, in short, no such authorization or
duty. The effect, however, of making it so payable, insofar as the
making of tender and the need for presentment are concerned, is
governed by other sections.
Section 3-122. Accrual Of Cause Of Action.
(1) A cause of action against a maker or an acceptor accrues
(a) in the case of a time instrument on the day after maturity;
(b) in the case of a demand instrument upon its date or, if no
date is stated, on the date of issue.
(2) A cause of action against the obligor of a demand or time
certificate of deposit accrues upon demand, but demand on a
time certificate may not be made until on or after the date of
maturity.
(3) A cause of action against a drawer of a draft or an indorser of
any instrument accrues upon demand following dishonor of the
instrument. Notice of dishonor is a demand.
(4) Unless an instrument provides otherwise, interest runs at the
rate provided by law for a judgment
(a) in the case of a maker, acceptor or other primary obligor
of a demand instrument, from the date of demand;
(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of the cause of
action.
This section, without precise previous provision in the statutes, is
designed to articulate the point at which a cause of action accrues to
the end, it may be supposed, that a holder of an instrument may know
when he is entitled to sue thereon and when the statute of limitations
will begin to run so as to terminate the power to sue. There are other
sections of the Code in which the conditions precedent to the liability
178 HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER, 27 (1959).
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of parties, particularly secondary parties, are spelled out.179 These
statutes must, of course, be complied with in order to come within
the terms of the undertaking of particular obligors.
Section (1)(a) states the rule that has generally been assumed to
exist since the adoption of the N.I.L 80 The assumption is that the
debtor has the full day of maturity in which to pay, so the cause of
action begins the next day. Prior to the N.I.L.'s adoption, the obligor
had three additional days of grace in which to pay, and no cause of
action accrued until the expiration of this period.'8' In the case of
an installment note, a cause of action arises for each instalment after
its maturity, and the contract is divisible. Thus recovery of one in-
stallment does not preclude a subsequent action to recover an install-
ment accruing after the first suit. 82
The maturity of the instrument may involve specific provisions in
a particular note, which will govern. In Loveday v. Parker,'88 an
instrument on its face matured on August 1, but the maker had in-
dorsed on the back: "Should I make a transfer of my real estate
before this note becomes due, I agree to pay the same on demand."
A suit prior to August 1, in which the maker is alleged to have made a
transfer of his real estate, is good against demurrer.
Extension and acceleration clauses have been somewhat trouble-
some, particularly where the statute of limitations is claimed to have
barred action. Insofar as acceleration clauses are concerned, the court
has adopted the rule that these are for the benefit of the obligee and
can be waived by him, thus the cause of action does not accrue (within
the meaning of the statute of limitations) until the ultimate due date. 8'
In circumstances where the time of payment has been extended, the
cause of action does not accrue until the expiration of the extension." 5
Clause (1) (b), concerning demand instruments, states the rule as
it has been followed in Washington. 8
179 E.g., Sections 3-413, 3-414, 3-416, 3-501, 3-507, 3-511.
'
8 Hillman v. Stanley, 56 Wash. 320, 105 Pac. 816 (1909).
1s Joergenson v. Joergenson, 28 Wash. 477, 68 Pac. 913 (1902).
182 Davis v. Hibbs, 73 Wash. 315, 131 Pac. 1135 (1913).
188 50 Wash. 260, 97 Pac. 62 (1908). See also Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wn2d 382,
161 P.2d 142 (1945), on the statute of limitations.
18 4 Haggard v. Sanglin, 69 Wash. 151, 124 Pac. 373 (1912) ; White v. Krutz, 37
Wash. 34, 79 Pac. 495 (1905) ; First Nat'l Bank of Snohomish v. Parker, 28 Wash.
234, 68 Pac. 756, 92 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902).
185 Miller v. Miller, 90 Wash. 333, 156 Pac. 9 (1916) ; White v. Krutz, note 181
supra. In the White case an extension agreed to by a mortgagor was effective even
against a transferee of the mortgaged property who had no knowledge of the extension.
18 6 Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Shufeldt, 78 Fed. 292 (C. A. Wash. 1897); Rushlight
v. McLain, 28 Wn.2d 189, 182 P.2d 62 (1947); Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wn.2d 382, 161
P.2d 142 (1945) ; Chatos v. Levas, 14 Wn.2d 317, 128 P.2d 284 (1942) ; Northwestern
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. Clause (2) states the rule that has been almost, if not completely,
universally followed.18 ' The certificate of deposit is sufficiently unlike
other demand instruments to require this separate and distinct treat-
ment. Though there has been no clearcut decision on the point, one
opinion does suggest that a claim on a deposit may be used as a
set-off against the bank, without a prior demand for payment. 8 It is
conceivable that this rule survives the adoption of the Code.
Clause (3), while technically consistent with the obligations of
secondary parties, is not consistent with the purpose of the statute of
limitations. Under this clause, a claim against the drawer of any
draft (and this would include a check) 8 and the indorser of any
instrument accrues only on demand after dishonor. Concerning the
indorser, it seems fairly clear that the statute of limitations problem
is usually moot, because a claim against him can be lost by delay in
presentment, notice and (occasionally) protest.' A question seems
to be posed, though, which this writer is reluctant to undertake to
answer: Observe that the demand requirement may be satisfied by
a notice of dishonor. What, though, is the effect of a waiver of such
notice? The Code clearly recognizes that presentment, notice and
protest can be waived. 9' Does it follow that the holder of such a
note can, by the simple expedient of never demanding payment,
prevent the running of the statute of limitations?
This very problem is much more acute in the case of the drawer
for he is, in effect, discharged only to the extent of harm by unexcused
delay. 2 In states not having the Code, the problem has most fre-
quently been resolved by decisions that the statute of limitations runs
in favor of the drawer from the date of issue or, at most, from a short
time thereafter. 3 The basic theory is that the holder ought not be
permitted to prolong indefinitely the accrual of a cause of action
against the drawer, merely by delaying performance of the conditions
precedent to his liability. Though not involving the precise point here
Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 102 Wash. 570, 173 Pac. 730 (1918) ; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14
Wash. 129, 44 Pac. 138 (1896).
187 BRITTON, BILLS & NOTES 481 (2d ed. 1961).
188 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac.





193 Boston, Bills and Notes: Statute of Limitations on Checks, 15 OKLA. L. REv.
36 (1962).
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involved, a Washington decision is consistent with this policy."9 4 The
Code seems to have rejected this theory. 95
Further, this section of the Code has rejected the heretofore com-
pelling analogy between certified checks and certificates of deposits,
by which Courts have tended to apply the rule stated in subsection (2)
to the liability of certifying banks. The Code treats all acceptors
alike in subsection (1), accruing the cause of action on the date of
execution or issue.196
Though the first three sub-sections state the rules for determining
the accrual of a cause of action, and though as we have seen this is
pertinent to the statute of limitations, this section of the Code is
obviously not intended to replace the statutes stating the limitation
period, 9' or the statute9" and decisions 99 as to how it may be tolled.
Subsection (4), pertaining to the allowance of interest as damages
for nonpayment or delay in payment, has been modified in several of
the states, so as to negate the running of interest before demand on
cashier's checks or certified checks."' It has, to date, always been
proposed for adoption in Washington in its original form, as stated
above.
Even though the section is broadly worded, there seems no reason
to doubt that particular variations may be allowed. For example,
there is no reason to foresee that a court might not apply a different
rule for computing interest to notes given for stock subscriptions, as
it has done in the past.2"' Further, the statutes0 2 and decisions0 3
concerning interest on state, municipal and other government obliga-
tions are not impliedly repealed by adoption of the Code.
Section 3-201. Transfer: Right To Indorsement.
(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as
the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has
194 Brooks v. The Trustee Co., 76 Wash. 589, 136 Pac. 1152 (1913).
195 BAILEY, BANK CHECKS § 1.17 (1962).196 Id.
197 RCW ch. 4.16.198 RCV1 4.16270 (specifically mentioning bills and notes).
199 E.g., Dolby v. Fisher, 1 Wn2d 181, 95 P.2d 369 (1939) ; Pederson v. Jordan, 177
Wash. 379, 32 P.2d 114 (1934); O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P2d 641
(1933) ; Van de Ven v. Overlook Mining & Dev. Co., 146 Wash. 332, 262 Pac. 981
(1928) ; Griffin v. Lear, 123 Wash. 191, 212 Pac. 271 (1923) ; Warnock v. Itawis, 38
Wash. 144, 80 Pac. 297 (1905).
200 Braucher, UCC Article 3-Commercial Paper-New'York Variations, 17 RuT-
GERS L. REv. 57, 65 (1962).
201 Seattle Trust Co. v. Pitner, 18 Wash. 401, 51 Pac. 1048 (1898).
202 E.g., RCW 36.29.040, 39.56.010, 39.56.020, 35.49.030, 28.48.100.
203 E.g., State ex rel. Strahorn v. Stout, 43 Wash. 501, 86 Pac. 848 (1906) ; State
ex rel. Capital Nat'l Bank v. Young, 22 Wash. 547, 61 Pac. 725 (1900)..
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himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the
instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or
claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a
later holder in due course.
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests the fore-
going rights in the transferee to the extent of the interest
transferred.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instru-
ment not then payable to bearer gives the transferee the spe-
cifically enforceable right to have the unqualified indorsement
of the transferor. Negotiation takes effect only when the in-
dorsement is made and until that time there is no presumption
that the transferee is the owner.
With one minor exception, to be commented upon in connection
with paragraph (3) of this section, the Washington Court has, in
following the N.I.L., taken an approach entirely consistent with the
provisions of the Code.
In a very early case,04 it was recognized that the owner of nego-
tiable paper will not always be the holder thereof, for the note in suit
was payable to an agent, yet suit by the principal (who was shown
to be the actual owner) was permitted. The court mentions specifically
that the indorsement of the designated payee, the agent, was not
required. Though this was not technically a "transfer" problem, the
holding is consistent with the first paragraph of this section. Many
cases have recognized the right of a transferee, such as an assignee
for collection, to recover on the paper."' The Court has recognized
the difference between the rights of the transferee, and the rights of
the holder, particularly the due course holder.0 6 This difference is
emphasized in the last ten words of clause (3) of the Code section.
That the transferee, even without technical negotiation, is invested
with the rights of his transferor has often been recognized. Most
frequently, the transferor has been demonstrated to be a due course
holder, with the result that the transferee has all the rights of such
204 Stinson v. Sachs, 8 Wash. 391, 36 Pac. 287 (1894).
205 First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 137 Fed. 505 (9th Cir. 1905) ; Metzger v. Sigall, 83
Wash. 80, 145 Pac. 72 (1914) ; Seattle Nat'I Bank v. Emmons 16 Wash. 585, 48 Pac.
262 (1897) ; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14 Wash. 129, 44 Pac. 138 (1896) ; Riddell v. Prich-
ard, 12 Wash. 601, 41 Pac. 905 (1895) ; McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 22 Pac.
209 (1892).
206 O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 Wash. 308, 89 Pac. 885 (1907), 48 Wash. 493, 93 Pac.
1078 (1908).
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holder.20 7 The Code makes one exception to this, in that no reacquirer
who was a participant in any fraud or illegality" 8 or who at any time
he held the instrument had knowledge of any defense or claim may
assert the rights of the due course holder from whom he reacquires.00
The Washington Court has not had occasion to pass upon this ques-
tion, though it has adverted to the problem. 10
There is believed to be one situation wherein a transferee, even
though he is not a due course holder, may find himself in a superior
position to that of his transferor. This situation involves the rules of
set-off, a matter not specifically covered by the Code, where frequently
an assignee will, under normal contract rules, be free of claims assert-
able against his transferor. The issue here is quite apart from the
Code and from any statute respecting negotiability;' suffice it only
to note that prior to the Code, there have been decisions protecting
assignees from set-offs which could have been asserted had there been
no assignment.212 The Code does not seem to alter this rule. The
matter will be relevant to a discussion of section 3-306.
The rights of security holders in negotiable instruments have been
settled entirely in accordance with paragraph (2) of this section."12
207 Wells v. Duffy, 69 Wash. 310, 124 Pac. 907 (1912) ; Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash.
534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911) ; Gross v. Bennington, 52 Wash. 417, 100 Pac. 846 (1909) ;
Fischer v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 923 (1901); Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer,
15 Wash. 290, 46 Pac. 254 (1896).
208 As to the limits suggested by these words, see Britton, Holder in Due Course-
A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law With Those of
Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. Rav. 417, 446 (1954).209 Professor Braucher has written: "In 1954 the Chase National Bank criticized
the Code provision that a transferee of an instrument 'who as a prior holder had notice
of a defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later
holder in due course! The criticism was answered in 1955, but was noted by the Law
Revision Commission and renewed by the Clearing House. The clarification now
suggested is to refer to notice 'at the time he acquired the instrument.'
"This solution is a dubious one. It would affect two types of cases: (1) A is
induced by fraud to make a note to B, who gives it to C, an innocent donee; C learns
of the fraud, sells the note to D, a holder in due course, and later reacquires the note
from D; (2) A is induced by fraud to make a note to B, who pledges it to C, a holder
in due course with power of sale; C learns of the fraud, sells the note to D, a holder in
due course, and later reacquires the note from D. In both cases the Code seems to
remit C to his former rights. The Clearing House proposal would allow C to assert
whatever rights D had. In the pledge case, C's former rights might include the
benefits of his power of sale, and in that event, the two rules might reach the same
result." Braucher, UCC Article 3-Commercial Paper-New York Variations, 17
RUTGERs L. REv. 57, 66 (1962).2 10 Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911).2 11 BlviroN, BILLS AND NoTas § 153 (2d ed. 1961).
212 Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Shufeldt, 87 Fed. 669 (9th Cir. 1898) ; National Bank
of Commerce v. Galland, 14 Wash. 502, 45 Pac. 35 (1896).21 8 Crewdson v. Shultz, 254 Fed. 24 (9th Cir. 1918) ; In re Dungeness Timber Co.,
Inc., 50 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Wash. 1942) (attorney's charging lien); John Davis &
Co. v. Bedgisoff, 155 Wash. 127, 283 Pac. 665 (1930) ; Guaranty Security Co. v. Coad,
114 Wash. 156, 195 Pac. 22, 197 Pac. 326 (1921) ; National Bank of the Republic v.
Hines, 112 Wash. 352, 192 Pac. 899 (1920) ; Shultz v. Crewdson, 95 Wash. 266, 163
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Under paragraph (3), it is quite clear that the transferee of order
paper without indorsement does not become a due course holder, until
the indorsement is actually affixed. This is in accord with the Wash-
ington view, generally.214 The single case not consistent with this rule
is Kiley v. Bugge,215 which held in substance that an estoppel in pals
may be a substitute for negotiation. The facts were that the defend-
ants had executed in favor of the payee a note and mortgage, intending
it to be used to discharge a prior mortgage. The payee, instead, trans-
ferred it without indorsement to the plaintiff, without ever having dis-
charged the prior mortgage. In an action by the plaintiff to foreclose
the mortgage, it was held that even though no indorsement of the
payee appeared, the maker was precluded by the "two innocents" rule
from asserting the defense of failure of consideration. This case has
been widely criticized, -12 and will not be effective under the Code.
The presumption of ownership deriving from possession under a
valid indorsement is important, largely because it will entitle the
possessor to recover on the instrument unless the defendant-obligor
establishes a defense. 21" Two early Washington decisions218 illustrate
the significance of the presence of the indorsement. In the Brooks
case, the Court said:
Nor did the court err in permitting the notes to be received in evi-
dence over appellants' objection that the execution of their assignment
was not duly proven. The note contained the following indorsement:
"Pay to the order of Mary A. Brooks, without recourse, Charles F.
Emery Real Estate Loan Company [the payee], per R. M. Palmer,
Treasurer." Possession of the note, coupled with the indorsement in
question, was sufficient prima facie to establish that plaintiff was the
owner and holder thereof, and that it was unpaid.219
There is, finally, one little curiosity about subsection (3), in that
it gives the taker for value the right to have the "unqualified" indorse-
Pac. 734 (1917) ; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Sesnon Co., 68 Wash. 434, 123 Pac.
602 (1912).
214 Swanson v. Mohr, 169 Wash. 461, 169 Pac. 461 (1932); Willett v. Central
Yakima Ranches Co., 126 Wash. 587, 219 Pac. 20 (1923); Hanson v. Roesch, 104
Wash. 257, 176 Pac. 349 (1918); Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving
Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917), noted 15 MIcH. L. RaV. 512 (1917) ; Swenson
v. Stoltz, 36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (1904) ; Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202,
60 Pac. 414 (1900).
215 Kiley v. Bugge, 165 Wash. 677, 5 P.2d 1038 (1931), noted, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1112 (1932).
216 BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 545 (7th ed. 1948); 45
HARV. L. REV. 1112 (1932).
217 Section 3-307(2).
218 Brooks v. James, 16 Wash. 335, 47 Pac. 751 (1897) ; D. M. Osborne & Co. v.
Stevens, 15 Wash. 478, 46 Pac. 1027 (1896).
219 16 Wash. 335, 337-38 (1897).
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ment of the transferor. The curiosity is that the Code does not tell
us the difference between a qualified and an unqualified indorsement.
As a matter of fact, the words "qualified indorsement" do not appear
in the Code. 2 0 Clearly what is meant by "unqualified" is that it shall
be with recourse.
Section 3-202. Negotiation.
(1) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that
the transferee becomes a holder. If the instruments is payable
to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorse-
ment; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
(2) An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder
and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as
to become a part thereof.
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it con-
veys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports
to be of less it operates only as a partial assignment.
(4) Words of assignment, condition, waiver, guaranty, limitation
or disclaimer of liability and the like accompanying an indorse-
ment do not affect its character as an indorsement.
There is a wealth of wisdom in the opening sentence of paragraph
(1) of this section. Negotiation is a particular form of transfer: one
which makes the transferee the holder of the paper, and this means:
"a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument
or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his
order or to bearer or in blank."22' Herein lies the clue to some of the
real defenses. A taker may act in all innocence and purchase for full
value an instrument bearing a forged indorsement which is necessary
to his title. It is of no concern that he adequately fulfills all of the
"in due course" requirements of the Code or of the N.I.L.; his claim
is lost on an entirely different ground: he is not the holder.
The details about negotiation spelled out in subsection (1) do not
vary from previous law. Order paper can only be negotiated by in-
dorsement and delivery. It has been held, for example, that where
an instrument payable on its face to the order of "Holdorf Oyster Co.,"
was indorsed: "Pres. Dwight Holdorf; Sec. Opal Holdorf," the in-
220 Section 3-414 omits these words.
221 Section 1-201 (20).
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dorsement (failing to designate the payee company) was ineffective
to make the transferee the holder.222 The Code does not change the
appropriate rule.2
It has usually been recognized, as the Code provides, that bearer
paper may be negotiated by delivery only. 2 The single exception to
this225 seems erroneously decided. Under the Code, the case would be
decided contrary to its actual holding for two reasons: First, once the
paper had been indorsed in blank, it would be bearer paper (and thus
negotiable by delivery) until subsequently specially indorsed. Second,
what the questioned indorsement amounted to was a bank transit
number placed on the check as an indorsement. Under the Code, one
bank may transfer to another by any indorsement identifying the
transferor, and this would include the use of the transferor's transit
number.226
There seems to be no Washington decision respecting the rules
stated in paragraph (2). In connection with the requirement that the
indorsement be written "by or on behalf of the holder," there is no
reason to suppose that this will change the result in the case of Glaser
v. Connell22 . previously alluded to. There, it will be recalled, the
payee was designated as the "Holdorf Oyster Co.," and the indorse-
ment, without indicating that the company as such indorsed, was
merely: "Pres. Dwight Holdorf; Sec. Opal Holdorf." Though in a
manner of speaking, such an indorsement may be "on behalf of the
holder," this circumstance is not apparent from the face of the in-
dorsement. All that the Code seems to accomplish is to insure that
an indorsement for the Holdorf Oyster Co., by the president and
secretary, would be sufficient. The indorsements actually used were
not such.
As provided in paragraph (3), an indorsement must be of the entire
instrument or of the entire unpaid portion thereof, and any attempted
partial indorsement is merely a partial assignment. 8
The Washington Court's position respecting the addition of words
222 Glaser v. Connell, 47 Wn.2d 622, 289 P.2d 364 (1955).
223 See also Nat'l City Bank of Seattle v. Titlow, 233 Fed. 838 (W.D. Wash. 1916)
(certificate of deposit payable to the order of "ourselves" requires the indorsement
of the issuer).
224 Hellar v. Nat'l City Co., 171 Wash. 585, 18 P.2d 480 (1933) ; Doucette v.
Old Nat'l Bank & Union Trust Co., 161 Wash. 159, 296 Pac. 570 (1931).
225 Bowles v. Billik, 27 Wn.2d 629, 178 P.2d 954 (1947), noted, 23 WASH. L. REV.
74 (1948).
226 Section 4-206.
227 Note 222 supra.
221 Swanson v. Mohr, 169 Wash. 461, 14 P.2d 8 (1932).
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of assignment or guaranty to an indorsement is not entirely clear. The
court has uniformly held that the addition of words of guaranty to an
otherwise unqualified indorsement do not preclude the effectiveness of
the indorsement as a transfer of the paper. 29 The Code upholds this
rule. However, in Wilson v. Pearce,23° the court took a different view
as respects the addition of words of assignment. The court treated
this transfer as an assignment only, but the Code would deem this to
be an indorsement. To be observed is that the rule of subsection (4)
is limited to the addition of words of assignment to the indorsement
on the paper itself. It is the signature on the negotiable paper that is
of primary importance and which constitutes the indorsement. Words
of assignment at such a spot are surplusage. If the transferor wants
to assign rather than negotiate, the available method is by separate
written assignment. This type of writing will constitute a simple
assignment both under the Code and under prior law. 3'
Section 3-203. Wrong Or Misspelled Name.
Where an instrument is made payable to a person under a misspelled
name or one other than his own he may indorse in that name or his
own or both; but signature in both names may be required by a
person paying or giving value for the instrument.
No decisions or statutes, other than the N.I.L.'s counterpart to this
section, 2 have been found in Washington. The Official Comments
spell out the changes produced by the Code.
Section 3-204. Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement.
(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose
order it makes the instrument payable. Any instrument spe-
cially indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special
indorsee and may be further negotiated only by his indorse-
ment.
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and
may consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to
order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and
may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed.
229 Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer, 15 Wash. 290, 46 Pac. 254 (1896) ; Nat'l Bank of
Commerce v. Galland, 14 Wash. 502, 45 Pac. 35 (1896).
230 57 Wn.2d 44, 355 P.2d 154 (1960).
2 31 Wolarich v. Van Kirk, 36 Wn.2d 212, 217 P.2d 319 (1950).
232 RCW 62.01.043 [NIL § 43].
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(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special
indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser in
blank any contract consistent with the character of the indorse-
ment.
The major contribution of this section is to clarify a point which
has been much discussed but on which there is no particular Wash-
ington authority. This point involves the effect of a special indorse-
ment on paper that was once bearer paper, either because originally
issued on its face payable to bearer, or because indorsed in blank.
The Code removes the conflicting provisions of the N.I.L. which have
been the source of trouble, and adopts the rule that a special indorse-
ment on any paper which was bearer prior to that indorsement is
effective. This means that the indorsement of the designated special
indorsee is always required for further negotiation.233
The other details spelled out in this section do not depart from
established principle. That a special indorsement designates the par-
ticular indorsee and that the further indorsement of that one is re-
quired, as stated in paragraph (1), has been true in Washington. 3 '
On the other hand, a blank indorsement specifies no indorsee and thus
makes the paper payable to bearer. 35 The transfer of such paper with-
out subsequent indorsement is not irregular,' so a taker may become
a holder in due course.
Paragraph (3) is in the precise words of the present statute.
[This discussion will be continued in a subsequent issue.]
233 Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law
and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEx. L. Rav. 153, 162 (1953).
234 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac.
870 (1917), noted, 15 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1917).
235 National Sur. Corp. v. Dore, 187 Wash. 274, 60 P.2d 12 (1936).
236 Broadway Bank of Kansas City v. Whittaker, 177 Wash. 62, 30 P.2d 993 (1934).
237 RCW 62.01.035 [NIL § 35].
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